Point. Its exterior walls were complete, and with a proper armament and garrison it was a strong work.

Early in December an officer, Major Bnell,[1] was sent from Washington with verbal instructions for Major Anderson. These were afterwards reduced to writing.[2] " You are carefully to avoid " (BO ran these instructions) "every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression; and, for that reason, you are not, without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude. But you are to hold possession of the forts in this harbor, and, if attacked, you are to defend yourself •to the last extremity.[3] The smallnesa of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack oil or attempt to take possession of any one of them will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance.

You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act."

This evidence—" of a design to proceed to a hostile act"—Major Anderson thought he had discovered.[4] It is not necessary that we should

examine

Afterwards Major-General D. C. Buell.

[2] I W. II., 89, 103, 117.

[3] This was afterwards modified in a letter from Secretary Floyd to Major Anderson,—I W. R., 103,—and Anderson was informed that it was " neither expected nor desired that" he " should expose " his ** own life or that of" his " men in a hopeless conflict in defence of these forts."

[4] "Many things convinced me that the authorities of the State designed to proceed to a hostile act. Under this impression I could not hesitate